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THE SLAVE, THE FETUS, THE BODY: 
ARTICULATING BIOPOWER AND THE 
PREGNANT WOMAN 
Kevin Kuswa, Paul Achter University of Richmond, and 
Elizabeth Lauzon, University of Southern California 
Abstract: Many slaveholders attempted to justify the institution 
of slavery in the United States by claiming that the practice of 
slavery was actually in the interests of the slaves themselves. 
Not only are these arguments invalid because they justify 
inhumane treatment and the imprisonment of innocent human 
beings, they also contain a dangerous paternalism (a “speaking 
for”) that has not vacated the social sphere. Indeed, this same 
logic—the notion that bodies can be regulated and controlled 
for their own protection—is presently being used to speak for 
the fetus in order to justify fetal rights. Borrowing from Berlant 
(1997), these fetal rights arguments work against the interests of 
the mother, constituting pregnant women as chattel and 
reinforcing the governing logics of a fetal and infantile 
citizenship. 
In the spirit of W.E.B. Du Bois, we contend that, “she must 
have the right of motherhood at her own discretion,” regardless 
of deployments of fetal citizenship (2007, p. 121). A pregnant 
woman should have the right to abort the fetus just as those 
enslaved had and have the right to freedom. Following 
Koppelman, we note that abortion restrictions result in the 
involuntary servitude of women to the fetus and effectively 
impede pregnant women from exercising their right to break a 
contract with the fetus. Consequently this essay argues that we 
have the responsibility to defend reproductive freedom based on 
the concept of prohibiting involuntary servitude. 
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Introduction 
 In a speech given to the Commonwealth Club in San 
Francisco, in August 1999, Senator John McCain explained 
his stance on abortion this way: 
I’d love to see a point where [Roe v. Wade] is 
irrelevant, and could be repealed because abortion is 
no longer necessary. But certainly in the short term, 
or even the long term, I would not support repeal of 
Roe v. Wade, which would then force x number of 
women to [undergo] illegal and dangerous 
operations (Marinucci, 1999). 
As a presidential candidate McCain’s views have become 
much less confusing, and he now opposes abortion rights 
and favors overturning Roe. This past year, in an interview 
with “Meet the Press,” McCain bluntly stated that he has 
“always been pro-life, unchanging and unwavering” 
(Conason, 2008). Apparently nine years and a presidential 
nomination race have changed Senator McCain’s views. If 
this trend continues, it will not be long before McCain is 
making claims like his former opponent and fellow 
Republican Mike Huckabee. As the 2008 Republican 
primary race took shape, an interviewer asked Huckabee if 
use of the so-called “morning after” pill “counted” as an 
abortion. He stated in his answer: “Anything that ends the 
life after it has been fertilized to me is problematic, because 
it is a life at that point” (Scherer, 2007). Elaborating, the 
Baptist pastor and former Arkansas governor added that the 
time had come for the view that abortion is murder to 
prevail: “... it took us a long time to come to the conviction 
that slavery was fundamentally wrong and that it was not a 
political issue, but a moral issue.” 
 Huckabee’s comparison of the practice of abortion 
to the practice of slavery conjures up a certain kind of fetal 
body—a living body with rights—that is in danger without 
protections from the government. These conservative 
arguments, the same ones that would position the image of a 
black man being lynched alongside the image of an aborted 
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fetus, are attempting to equate the plight of the figure of the 
slave in U.S. history to that of the contemporary fetus. This 
slavery analogy must be challenged because it forces 
individuals to attach their citizenship to the decision that 
abortion is the murder of the fetus. The result is an infantile 
citizenship that enslaves us all to the act’s immorality and 
requires that we demand abortion restrictions to secure the 
freedom of the fetus. By comparing “pro-life morality” to 
the abolition of slavery, many fetal rights advocates see 
themselves as speaking for a subjugated class of citizens 
who cannot speak on their own. 
The problem here is that the very status of the fetal 
body is precisely the issue being debated. Unlike the bodies 
of the men and women who were enslaved and who 
abolished slavery, the fetal body presents a challenge for the 
pro-life position because its classification as a distinct life is 
continually in flux. Put another way, the gap between the 
adult body that usually serves as a sign of the citizen, and the 
body that is typically imagined as a fetus, helps us 
understand how pro-life rhetoric works. This move, we 
argue, invests the fetus with a body, a personhood, and a 
corresponding citizenship that is separate from and often at 
odds with its mother. If the pro-life stance is correct—that 
the fetus, like the slave, will one day be set free by law—the 
comparison must also be reversed to examine how the fetal 
body is ascribed rights and privileges.  
Absent a discussion of the pregnant woman and her 
rights, fetal citizenship is elevated and given access to justice 
through the values of morality and life. Comparing fetuses to 
slaves should, contrary to Huckabee’s statement, reinforce 
the centrality of the pregnant woman and the mother's body 
to any conception of citizenship. Indeed, in opposition to this 
pro-life position, we articulate a reversal: the history of 
slavery actually warns us against subjugating women to a 
construction of pregnancy and re/production as subordinate 
to the sign of the fetus. Rhetorical constructions of the fetal 
body as analogous to the body of the slave only act to 
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devalue the pregnant mother and motherhood by enslaving 
both to the fetus. 
 
Power over and through the body: The fetus as “slave” 
Many of the laws regulating reproduction are 
attempts by the state to control the capacity and energy of 
pregnant women in order to “save the fetus.” Furthermore, 
comparisons between the fetal body and the slave body are 
being juxtaposed in order to harness claims of morality and 
to exert additional power over women’s bodies. As LaDelle 
McWhorter argues, “the anchor points for exercises of power 
are always bodies” (McWhorter, 2004). The target of 
regimes of power, she shows, is “bodies—their capacities, 
their energies, their pleasures.” The juxtaposition of the 
images of lynched slaves and aborted fetuses is an example 
of how two such regimes of power intersect and then 
consolidate their unique governing apparatus. McWhorter 
argues: 
(I)n present-day discourse and institutions, race and 
sex intersect primarily at points where people think 
in terms of normality and abnormality or deviance, 
where people have major managerial goals for large 
populations, and where there is a strong desire to 
control human development. […] if we are to 
overcome the oppressive effects of these conceptual 
instruments of power, we will have to address the 
specific and multileveled regimes of power within 
which they were conceived and in which they 
continue to function as categories of normalization. 
But understanding their genealogical similarities 
should make those analyses both less difficult to 
construct and more accurate and effective as 
antiracist and antisexist interventions in modern 
political life (p. 54). 
Addressing “specific and multileveled regimes” 
implies that we cannot limit our analysis of regimes of 
power to present-day abortion discourse; consequently, we 
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gesture to a genealogy of slavery and its justifications as a 
crucial starting point. More specifically, we ask, how are 
arguments that resemble pro-slavery rhetoric appearing in 
the abortion controversy? Are there resonances between the 
position that “slaves need slavery for their own protection” 
and the position that abortion should be restricted because 
the fetus needs protection?  
During the antebellum era, slaveholders and other 
defenders of slavery constructed justifications for slavery 
and its continuation, especially in the South. D.F. Ericson 
draws attention to one notable justification in defense of 
slavery: consent (Ericson 2000). Proponents of slavery were 
convinced that a lack of resistance was verification from 
slaves that they had agreed to their position in society, and 
reasoned that slaves had consented (indirectly) to their 
situation (Ericson, p 22). Slaves were perceived and 
constituted as generally obedient and content with their 
situation. Thomas Roderick Dew, a slave-holding humanities 
professor and eventual President of the College of William 
of Mary during the 1830’s, was a well-known slavery 
apologist. In his piece, Abolition of Negro Slavery, he 
asserted: 
In the debate in the Virginia legislature, no speaker 
insinuated even, we believe that the slaves in 
Virginia were not treated kindly; and all too agreed 
that they were most abundantly fed, and we have no 
doubt but that they form the happiest portion of our 
society. A merrier being does not exist on the face of 
the globe than the negro slave of the United States. 
(Dew, p. 66) 
This excerpt demonstrates that some slaveholders believed 
that slaves were happy and content with their status. Not 
only does this exemplify the naiveté of the slaveholders and 
the nature of this commonly held belief, it also exposes the 
rationale used to prove that slaves “consented” to their status 
because they were relatively happy and merry.  
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 According to the apologists, the signs of pleasure or 
happiness obviously prove that these humans wanted to 
remain slaves. James Henry Hammond expressed a similar 
view in his “Letter to an English Abolitionist.” 
And to sum up all, if pleasure is correctly defined to 
be the absence of pain – which, so far as the great 
body of mankind is concerned, is undoubtedly its 
true definition- I believe our slaves are the happiest 
three million of human beings on whom the sun 
shines. Into their Eden is coming Satan in the guise 
of an abolitionist (Hammond, p. 192). 
Hammond’s conception of pleasure allows him to contend 
that slaves are happy because “there is an absence of pain.” 
This tautological definition is so broad as to be meaningless 
and ignores the endemic and soul-destroying pain of being 
enslaved. Paternalistic slaveholders could turn a blind eye to 
the injustices holding up the practice of slavery, believing 
the absurdity that they were providing pleasure to the slaves. 
They could thus rationalize treating slaves like objects in 
order to provide for their happiness. Thomas Dew referenced 
a lack of rebellions as evidence that his thesis (that slaves 
were content with their position) was correct, erroneously 
observing that there were surprisingly few slave rebellions 
during the over two hundred years of slavery in the United 
States (Dew; Jenkins).1 Dew and Hammond, among others, 
believed that the consent of the slaves may not have been 
                                                                                                   
1 Thomas Roderick Dew in his defense of slavery tried to frame the 
insurrections that did take place as a result of the abolishment of slavery. 
He argued that insurrections rarely occurred when blacks were enslaved 
and that other crimes were more frequent. Furthermore, he pointed out that 
the threat of insurrection was very low (Faust, 1990, pp. 69-70). The first 
instance of slavery in North America was in New England when the 
settlers captured the Pequot American Indians and enslaved them in 1637. 
Later, the slave trade reached America and blacks were imported as slaves 
because they were better laborers. (Jenkins 3); Thomas R. Dew, 
“Abolition of Negro Slavery,” American Quarterly Review, XII (1832) 
189-265. 
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direct, but their actions served to confirm to the slaveholders 
that the slaves were not opposed to their standing in society.2  
 In the same way, advocates of abortion restrictions 
declare that when a woman consents to sex she is 
simultaneously consenting to the risk of pregnancy. This 
conclusion is flawed because even if the woman’s consent to 
sex is explicit, she does not automatically consent to 
pregnancy in the same moment. For example, when a person 
decides to engage in a dangerous activity she recognizes that 
there is a risk of injury but does not necessarily consent to 
actually being injured. McDonagh argues that even an 
implicit consent to pregnancy is not sufficient to constitute 
consent (McDonagh, 1996). She provides the example of 
rape, noting that a woman who does not verbally and 
explicitly say “no” to sexual intercourse is not implicitly 
consenting to intercourse. Furthermore, Koppelman contends 
that women should have the right to abort the fetus even if 
they have consented to sex because, as reinforced by Bailey 
v. Alabama,3 a person has the right to break a contract at any 
point in time, despite prior consent to the agreement (1990, 
p. 491). Abortion restrictions result in the involuntary 
servitude of women to the fetus and effectively impede 
pregnant women from exercising their right to break a 
contract with the fetus. The Bailey case elucidates the notion 
that it is not permissible to criminalize a refusal of service to 
another person (or the fetus) because that would constitute a 
                                                                                                   
2 McDonagh compiled definitions of consent: it is a voluntary choice 
made by a person that is “direct” and “unequivocal… requiring no 
inference or implication to supply its meaning.” The person expressing 
consent has to be willing to allow an act to take place upon the body in 
question without resistance (McDonagh 6o).  
3 Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911); Bailey, a black laborer, 
was charged with fraud after defying a one year contract and a forward 
advancement of $15 for his service with the Riverside Company even 
though that fraud may not have been his intent. Justice Hughes stated that 
a criminalization of a lack of service imposes involuntary servitude. 
(Koppelman 491) 
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form of involuntary servitude (Koppelman, 1990, pp. 491-
493). Koppelmen concludes that it is illegal for the state to 
compel a woman to remain pregnant despite the fact she 
acquiesced to sexual intercourse.  
 The application of “consent” as a justification for 
slavery extended beyond the consent of blacks to slavery, for 
Ericson reveals how the “consent of the governed” was also 
deployed by slaveholders who proclaimed that the 
government enacted laws in support of slavery because “the 
representatives voted for what the governed desired (in the 
South that would consist of laws that supported and 
protected the institution of slavery)” (Ericson, 2000, p. 22). 
In the same way, pro-life members of society claim that 
restrictive abortion laws represent the desires of all the 
people and are thus made with the consent of the governed. 
Many citizens may endorse abortion restrictions, but the 
logic behind the “consent of the governed” argument is 
unsound because it ignores the ways that legislators exert 
biopower over pregnant women, just as slaveholders exerted 
biopower over their slaves. Slavery systematized the 
subordination of black men and women, for example, when 
slaveholders raped female slaves as a means to acquire more 
slaves. Paternalistic rhetoric is deeply embedded in the 
discourses that constitute slaves and fetuses, a disturbing  
tone common in justifications for slavery. As Ulrich B. 
Philips and John David Smith contended, slavery was an 
educative system for the civilization of the seemingly savage 
but child-like blacks that needed the help of paternalistic 
slaveholders (Foster, p. 666).4  
 Slave owners presumed they were helping the blacks 
by exposing them to a “superior culture” and educating them 
about racial inferiority (Ericson, 2000, p. 25). According to 
some slaveholders, abolishing slavery would jeopardize the 
                                                                                                   
4 Ulrich B. Philips was the author of American Negro Slavery, a defense 
of slavery in the South post-Revolutionary War era and into the early 
1800s. Additionally, John David Smith is the author of An Old Creed for 
the New South: Proslavery Ideology and Historiography, 1865-1918. 
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development of human progress, in particular the progress 
and development of blacks.5 Dew was concerned with the 
impact of emancipation on progress: 
An emancipation of our slaves would check at once 
that progress of improvement, which is now so 
manifest among them. The whites would either 
gradually withdraw, and leave whole districts or 
settlements in their possession, in which case they 
would sink rapidly in the scale of civilization; or the 
blacks, by closer intercourse, would bring the whites 
down to their level. In the contact between the 
civilized and uncivilized man, all history and 
experience show, that the former will be sure to sink 
to the level of the latter (Dew, p. 56). 
Slavery was seen as a means to elevate society from its 
primitive state, a mechanism, according to George Fitzhugh, 
for the strong to protect the weak (Ericson, 2000, p. 110).  
 Paternalistic rhetoric turns women, like slaves, into 
children who need guidance, especially with regards to 
making decisions about abortion and pregnancy. Laws such 
as informed consent are the state’s attempt to persuade 
women to make the “correct” choice by providing them with 
detailed information about abortion and its effects on the 
fetus. These laws presume that pregnant women are unaware 
of what an abortion actually is or its consequences. After 
being presented with biased information, women are then 
forced to wait twenty-four hours before selecting the 
procedure again. Abrams suggests that this form of 
paternalism denies women the ability to make their own 
independent choices (Abrams, 1995, p. 488). Informed 
consent and the twenty-four hour waiting period are just a 
few of the more blatant examples of paternalism in anti-
                                                                                                   
5 Evidence of the belief of racial inferiority is seen in Dew’s Abolition of 
Negro Slavery; “… the slave is not only economically but morally unfit 
for freedom. And first, idleness and consequent want, are of themselves 
sufficient to generate a catalogue of vices of the most mischievous ad 
destructive character.” (Dew 53) 
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abortion rhetoric. Justice Stevens in Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey points out in his dissent that the waiting period relies 
on flawed notions about a woman’s ability to make 
important decisions.6 Each limitation on abortion is another 
paternalistic move by the state to control the pregnant 
woman and make sure she does not act irrationally. Just as 
slaveholders pointed out the benefits of slavery for the 
slaves, the Justices in Casey defend abortion restrictions by 
contending that it may be better for the psychological health 
of the woman not to have the procedure, and that the waiting 
period thus allows for the woman to make a proper 
decision.7 
 The similarities between slavery and abortion 
restrictions do not stop there. Despite the separation of 
church and state, religion plays an important role in 
everyday life and politics as a whole. Likewise, during the 
era of slavery, apologists justified slavery by alluding to its 
presence in the Bible. Defenses of slavery contained in the 
Bible ranged from the Hebrews having slaves to Jesus not 
condemning Rome’s brutal forms of slavery. Other slavery 
proponents would point to a letter by Paul to Philemon that 
advises a servant return to his master and serve him 
obediently (Ericson, 2000, p. 19). Thornton Stringfellow, a 
Baptist minister and a prominent slaveholder in Virginia, 
focused his works on the benevolent aspects of bondage 
(Faust, 1981, p. 136). In his essay, A Brief Examination of 
Scripture Testimony on the Institution of Slavery, he drew on 
the authority of the Bible in order to prove his point: 
…we have shown from the text of the sacred 
volume, that when God entered into covenant with 
Abraham, it was with him as a slaveholder; that 
when he took his posterity by the hand in Egypt, five 
                                                                                                   
6 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505. U.S. 
833 (1992) 
7 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505. U.S. 
833 (1992) 
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hundred years afterwards to confirm the promise 
made by Abraham, it was done with them as 
slaveholders; that when he gave them a constitution 
of government, he gave them the right to perpetuate 
hereditary slavery […] 
We have also shown from authentic history 
that the institution of slavery existed in every family, 
and in every province of the Roman Empire, at the 
time the gospel was published to them. […] 
 We have also shown from the New 
Testaments, that all the churches are recognized as 
composed of masters and servants; and that they are 
instructed by Christ by how to discharge their 
relative duties; and finally, that in reference to the 
question which was then started, whether 
Christianity did not abolish the institution, or the 
right of one Christian to hold another Christian in 
bondage, we have shown, that “the words of our 
Lord Jesus Christ” are, that so far from this being the 
case, it adds to the obligation of the servant to render 
service with good will to his master, and that gospel 
fellowship is not to be entertained with persons who 
will not consent to it! 
 I will propose, in fourth place, to show that 
the institution of slavery is full of mercy. […] this 
institution was a motive for sparing the prisoner’s 
life. […] (Stringfellow, p. 165). 
 
This excerpt illustrates how Biblical examples of slavery and 
obligations of servitude were used to conclude that slavery 
was acceptable and necessary. Slavery apologists like Dew 
who asserted that no religious law prohibiting slavery 
existed (in Faust, 1981, p. 61) also contributed to the notion 
that slavery was acceptable in the eyes of God. To a 
Christian nation, the obligation of the servant to serve, as 
pointed out by the Lord, was seen as a compelling reason to 
maintain slavery. Additionally, Stringfellow points out that 
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historically slavery had good intentions: the desire to “save” 
lives. 
Thus, to slavery apologists, the institution also 
served as a method for Christianizing the slaves. James 
Henry Hammond, a pro-slavery plantation owner who 
eventually was elected to Congress in the House of 
Representatives and later to the Senate, used the Christian 
conversion argument to defend his proposal to re-open the 
slave trade (Faust, 1981, pp. 168-169, 171). The 
Christianizing process was seen as a way to save the blacks 
from all the evils of the world. While paternalism may creep 
in through many justifications for slavery, the combination 
of proselytizing and missionary guilt within the religious 
justifications was particularly ironic. Stringfellow, for 
example, argued in his essay that the institution of slavery 
prevented the extinction of the slaves, an outcome that 
would have been certain if the slaves were freed: 
In their bondage here on earth, they have been much 
better provided for, and great multitudes of them 
have been made the freeman of the Lord Jesus 
Christ, and left this world rejoicing in hope of the 
glory of God. […] An officious meddling with the 
institution, from feelings and sentiments unknown to 
the Bible, may lead to the extermination of the slave 
race among us, who, taken as a while, are utterly 
unprepared for a high civil state; but benefit them, it 
cannot. Their condition, as a class, is now better 
than that of any other equal number of laborers on 
earth, and is daily improving (Stringfellow, p 166). 
Slaves are represented here as children who cannot take care 
of themselves. In the eyes of the apologists, freedom would 
condemn the slaves to death because they would be 
incapable of finding God and providing for themselves 
without the help of white slave owners. Today, religious 
discourse profoundly influences the public discussion of 
abortion restrictions. To abort a fetus is to kill a human life 
according to some religions, a belief that has an impact on 
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legislation concerning abortion at the state and national 
level. Speaking to an anti-abortion group in 2007, President 
George W. Bush invoked an explicitly religious argument 
against abortion and called on the adult citizen to protect the 
fetal one: 
It is important for all Americans to remember that 
our Declaration of Independence states that every 
person has the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness. It also states that these rights come from 
our Creator, and that governments are formed to 
secure these rights for all their citizens. And we 
believe every human life has value, and we pray for 
the day when every child is welcome in life and 
protected into law (“President Bush Calls,” 2007). 
As Bush rooted proper citizenship in religious faith, he 
invested the fetus with rights, and the pregnant woman 
became an afterthought when compared to the apparently 
vulnerable fetus. As we turn more directly to questions 
surrounding citizenship, it is important to note the common 
element of “servitude”—or the harnessing of the body for 
interests external to the body—between anti-abortion policy 
and the institution of slavery. Exploring this common 
element may open space for a new challenge against 
infantile citizenship that emphasizes equality, justice, and 
freedom from bodily intrusion. 
 
Citizenship as (opposition to) involuntary servitude 
 Just as many slaveholders argued that they were 
helping to protect the slaves, the pro-life movement tries to 
promote an image of the fetus in desperate need of the state’s 
good will—an unprotected person vulnerable to a wayward 
mother’s will. Fetal personhood transforms women into 
chattel and re-entrenches their inequality by treating them as 
a collective incubator. If a woman is forced into the position 
of property, it is reasonable to assert that her citizenship is 
jeopardized and uncertain. What happens to citizenship as a 
whole when the fetus is given access to its umbrella? Lauren 
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Berlant uncovers the true state of citizenship within the U.S. 
as a result of the independence of the fetus: “A nation made 
for adult citizens has been replaced by one imagined for 
fetuses and children” (Berlant, 1997, p. 1). Berlant names 
this “fetal citizenship” because both the fetus and the adults 
surrounding it begin to lack full citizenship: the fetus lacks 
full legal citizenship because it is contingent on the already 
limited rights of the mother, and adults lack full citizenship 
because they have ceded their reproductive rights to 
governmental control. 
 It appears, under the unified sign of citizenship, that 
this fetal standard can be used to compromise all other forms 
of identity, race and gender in order to create a more unified 
nation and “resolve” conflict (Berlant, 1997). Abortion 
restrictions are an example of creating fetal citizenship in 
that they attempt to resolve conflict between the woman and 
the fetus while washing away the woman’s identity based on 
gender or pregnancy. The pregnant woman is forgotten in 
the equation even though she is the essential component: she 
provides the body necessary for the fetus’s existence and 
survival. Representations of the independent fetus contribute 
to the constitution of the pregnant woman as a child with 
limited agency who needs help making important decisions 
in her life. In this way, Berlant suggests, “the pregnant 
woman becomes the child to the fetus” (Berlant, 1997, p. 
85).  
This process by which a paternalistic state controls the 
bodies of its citizens is familiar to the black population in the 
United States. By law, through prejudice in society, and in 
demonizing representations, blacks have been treated as less 
than human, as either uncivilized or unable to make proper 
decisions. Proslavery arguments propagated these views of 
blacks by positing the slave’s inability to survive in 
civilization without the help of their slaveholders. This 
rhetoric of inferiority, codified in the U.S. Constitution for 
many years, reinforced the idea that slaves were property 
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and unworthy of citizenship.8 Only after the Emancipation 
Proclamation and the 13th and 14th Amendments passed 
were blacks recognized as humans with a standing as full 
citizens. The problem in this instance is that personhood in 
the civil rights arena cannot be blindly applied in the context 
of the fetus. We align ourselves with Berlant (1997) when 
she claims that fetuses should not be added as “persons” to 
the concept of “people” because such a move would disrupt 
the “norms and principles of national embodiment” and the 
distinctions between the two groups (such as occupying an 
autonomous body and possessing ability to vote) would 
begin to disappear (pp. 97-98). Giving the fetus rights allows 
the state to speak for the fetus, denying the rights and 
citizenship of the pregnant woman who now exists to 
“serve” the fetus. 
Likewise, the enslavement of blacks constituted 
involuntary servitude, a means of controlling the black body 
within the production of services and labor for the benefit of 
the slaveholders. In an attempt to link these instances, 
Koppelman (1990) notes that the Supreme Court has deemed 
involuntary servitude as compulsory labor that is provided 
by one person for the benefit of another (Koppelman).9 Is 
there a valid comparison between historical conditions of 
slavery as involuntary servitude and abortion restrictions as 
involuntary servitude? One of the many tragic effects of 
slavery was the slaves’ loss of control over their own bodies 
                                                                                                   
8 At the Constitutional Convention the Three-Fifths Compromise between 
Northern and Southern States was created. For the purpose of 
representation in the House of Representatives, slaves were counted as 
three fifths of a person, thus allowing the South to have more 
representatives than if only the white population was counted. This 
dehumanized slaves and reinforced their position as less than human. 
Once again, slaves were only important as long as they benefited the white 
male property owner. Their own political situation was of no importance 
to slaveholders, other whites or the state (Berlant 18 
9 Slaughter House Cases 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72 (1873); Plessey v. 
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 542 (1896); Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 
16 (1906); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911). 
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(Condit, 1994, p. 71-72). In the same way, the combination 
of an unwanted pregnancy and restrictions on reproductive 
choice results in the dehumanization of pregnant women by 
situating them as chattel. Women who have unwanted 
pregnancies are often compelled to be mothers by the State, 
and are no longer in possession of free agency and control 
over their own bodies. They have become servants “with a 
special duty to serve others and not themselves” 
(Koppelman, 1990, p. 487). In this sense, women who are 
compelled to continue their pregnancy and become mothers 
without their own consent are encompassed by the definition 
of involuntary servitude. 
 If abortion restrictions create involuntary servitude, 
then the Thirteenth Amendment may protect the rights of a 
woman with an unwanted pregnancy to be free from 
involuntary servitude to the fetus (Koppelman).10, 11 
Citizenship, in theory, also means that blacks should control 
what they produce and that the white slaveholders could no 
longer control the labor and production of other human 
beings. The thirteenth amendment gives citizens control over 
their bodies and the productive capabilities they have—
individuals own their own service. Production or produce—
the core of what servitude and slavery are concerned with—
also applies to women and their capability to (re)produce. 
When they are forced to serve interests besides their own, 
when they lose their identity and find themselves treated as 
(re)producers and not humans, pregnant women are 
positioned as the property of society and a vessel for the 
fetus. The Thirteenth Amendment makes no delineation 
                                                                                                   
10 The Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution: 
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to 
their jurisdiction. 
Section 2. Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation. 
11 Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72 (1873) 
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between people to which the amendment should apply 
(Koppelman, 1990, p. 488). We contend that the amendment 
and the concept should apply to pregnant women even if 
their servitude is generally not as extreme as that 
experienced by slaves. In other words, it should be illegal for 
the state to compel a woman to remain pregnant despite the 
fact she acquiesced to sexual intercourse just as it is illegal to 
possess slaves (p. 491). 
 
Conclusions 
It is important to think of abortion restrictions as a 
form of involuntary servitude because of the impact they 
have on women across the country. Addressing how regimes 
of power are conceived and implemented is necessary in 
order to challenge and resist these oppressive regimes 
(McWhorter, 2004, p. 54). To ignore the possibility that 
what women experience, when compelled by the state to 
carry a fetus, is involuntary servitude is to allow for the 
continuation of pregnancy slavery in this country. We do not 
intend to trivialize what blacks experienced under slavery 
and there is no doubt of the unfathomably severe, violent, 
widespread, and dehumanizing consequences of slavery in 
this country. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the logic 
behind the slavery of blacks and the control of the pregnant 
body cannot and should not be compared. The process by 
which women are enslaved through paternalism, a loss of 
rights, and the reduction to property is reminiscent of 
slavery. 
 Coming full circle, when we see images of a fetus 
juxtaposed with images of lynched black men, we cannot 
ignore this comparison. The aim of this juxtaposition is to 
associate the immorality of lynching with the immorality of 
aborting a fetus, but close scrutiny disrupts the aim itself by 
demonstrating the very tangible erasure of the pregnant 
woman and the inapplicability of the slave-fetus analogy. 
We have to challenge the representations of the fetus as 
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always outside of the womb because the woman’s body 
existed before the fetus and is the pre-requisite for the fetus. 
 The pregnant body can become a site of resistance to 
state power because it no longer focuses on the separate 
entity that the body has the capacity to produce. This move 
helps explain that the fetus is not the enemy, for the real 
enemies are “those who would appropriate and solidify the 
symbolics of procreation in the service of social agendas 
hostile to women’s procreative integrity” (Morgan and 
Michaels, 1999, p. 6). By focusing on the pregnant body, the 
fetus is “reconnected” to the woman and prevents her 
erasure, which is a necessary step to prevent the reduction of 
her citizenship to “fetal citizenship” and infantilization. 
Using slavery as the starting point for our research and 
analyzing how pro-slavery arguments are resurfacing in pro-
life arguments today allows us to understand how power 
relations intersect and contribute to involuntary servitude. 
Our hope is that exposing the ways in which the state 
controls individuals through both pro-slavery and pro-life 
rhetoric could help challenge specific oppressive power 
structures surrounding citizenship. 
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